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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN
MARITAL DEDUCTIONS*
LEO W. LEARY**
I. INTRODUCTION
The estate tax marital deduction, introduced in the Revenue Act
of 1948,1 is of practical value to an attorney probating the estate of
a decedent, whose gross estate for Federal estate tax purposes (and
this may include much more than the probate estate2) will exceed
$60,000 plus claims against the estate and expenses of administration. 3
The marital deduction should also be considered when drafting the
will, or otherwise planning the estate, of a client whose gross estate at
death is likely to exceed the aforementioned amount.4 In order to
qualify for the marital deduction, several legal requirements must be
satisfied. The decedent whose estate is being probated must have been
at the time-of his death either a citizen of the United States or a resi-
dent alien,5 and he must be survived by a spouse.6 Only an "interest
* Parts of this paper were delivered as a lecture on December 10, 1954, at the
Fifth Annual Tax School of the Wisconsin Bar Association.
** B.A., LL.B., University of Wisconsin; S.J.D., University of Michigan; Asso-
ciate Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School.
1 §361 (a) added §812 (e) to the Internal Revenue Code of 1939. 62 STAT. 117
(1948). The section number has been changed to 2056 in the 1954 Code. 68A
STAT. 392 (1954).
2 E.g., jointly held property and life insurance proceeds includible in the gross
estate under I.R.C. §§2040 and 2042.
3 I.R.C. §2052 allows every decedent's estate an exemption of $60,000 and §2053
authorizes deductions for funeral expenses, administration expenses, claims
against the estate, and unpaid mortgages on decedent's assets where the latter
are included in the gross estate at their unencumbered value. In addition, de-
ductions for uncompensated casualty and theft losses during the settlement of
the estate are allowable under §2054 and charitable bequests and devises are
deductible subject to the limitations of §2055.
4 It has been suggested that existing and potential assets of a husband and wife
should be combined in order to determine whether there is a "marital deduction
problem." Sargent, A.B.C. and D. of Marital Deduction, 92 TRUSTS AND EsTATEs
746, 748 (1953).
5 I.R.C. §2056, which authorizes a marital deduction, is contared in Subchapter
A of Chapter 11. This subchapter applies only to the estates of U.S. citizens
or resident aliens. Subchapter B deals with estates of non-resident aliens and
contains no marital deduction provision. "However, if the decedent was a citi-
zen or resident, his estate is not deprived of the right to the marital deduction
by reason of the fact that his surviving spouse was a non-resident not a
citizen." Treas. Regs. 105, §81.47a (a).6 I.R.C. §2056 (a). In this paper it will ordinarily be assumed that the husband
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in property which passes or has passed from the decedent to his
surviving spouse" can qualify for the marital deduction 7 and then
only if such interest is included in decedent's gross estate,8 is not de-
ductible under section 2053, 9 does not exceed one-half of the adjusted
gross estate,' ° and is not an objectionable terminable interest."'
This paper reviews recent decisions, rulings, and 1954 Code amend-
ments involving these limitations.
II. NECESSITY OF INTEREST IN PROPERTY "PASSING" FROM
DECEDENT TO THE SURVIVING SPOUSE
An attorney drafting a will, or otherwise planning the estate, of a
client should ordinarily have no difficulty in complying with the re-
quirement that an interest in property pass from the decedent to the
surviving spouse. Code section 20 56(e) expressly provides that in-
terests received by will or as surviving joint owner satisfy this con-
dition, along with "proceeds of insurance on the life of the decedent
receivable" by the surviving spouse. 1 And in the administration of an
is the decedent and the wife is the surviving spouse, but §2056 (a) refers to a
deceased man or woman who is survived by a spouse.
"The status of an individual as the decedent's surviving spouse is deter-
mined at the time of the decedent's death. A legal separation which has not (at
the time of the decedent's death) terminated the marriage does not affect
such status for the purposes of section [2056 (a)]. A transfer by the decedent
during his lifetime to an individual to whom he was not married at the time
of the transfer but to whom he is married at the time of his death and who sur-
vives him is a transfer by the decedent to his surviving spouse. If an interest
in property passes from the decedent to a person who was his spouse but is
not married to him at the time of death, the interest is not considered as pass-
ing to the decedent's surviving spouse even though such person survives the
decedent." Sen. Rep. No. 1013, Part 2, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948), as reported
in 1948-1 Cum. Bull. 335.
7I.R.C. §2056 (a).
8 Id. E.g., an inter vivos gift to the wife not includible in the deceased husband's
gross estate cannot be claimed as a marital deduction.
9 Supra note 3. "An interest in property does not pass to the surviving spouse
from the decedent ... by reason of a claim against the estate, or any indebted-
ness in favor of the surviving spouse for which a deduction is allowed by
section [2053] .. . the payments made in satisfaction of such a claim or debt
... [do not] pass to such surviving spouse from the decedent . Sen. Rep.,
supra note 6, at 333.
10 I.R.C. §2056 (c). This section defines the adjusted gross estate as the gross
estate less deductions allowed under §§2053 and 2054, supra note 3. Thus, if
the decedent's adjusted gross estate is valued at $120,000 and all of it passes
to the surviving spouse, not more than $60,000 can qualify for the marital de-
duction. However, the $60,000 exemption allowed by section 2052 could be set
off against the portion of the adjusted gross estate not qualifying for the mari-
tal deduction. Cf. the example in Treas. Regs. 105, §81.47d (a).
11 I.R.C. §2056 (b) (1). This section is discussed in detail at pp. 12-13, infra.
In valuing interests which meet all of the requirements, reductions must be
made under §2056 (b) (4) for any death taxes payable out of such interests
and for any encumbrances upon them. See Estate of Edward V. Babcock, 23
T.C. No. 111 (1955) and Estate of Fielder J. Coffin, Par. 54, 245 P-H Memo
TC.
12 This section also provides that inter vivos transfers and interests received
through the exercise or non-exercise of a power of appointment held by the
decedent pass from him.
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intestate's estate, interests received by the surviving spouse through
inheritance or as dower or curtesy pass from the intestate.
A. Election by Widow to Take Against Deceased Husband's Will
A question arises, however, on the probate of a will containing
specific provisions for a wife who refuses them and elects to take
against the will. The Senate Finance Committee Report on the bill
which became the Revenue Act of 1948 stated that "if the surviving
spouse elects to take her share of the decedent's estate under the local
law instead of taking an interest under the will, the interest she takes
under the local law is by the definition in section [2056(e)] con-
sidered as passing from the decedent to the surviving spouse.' 3 So
the Treasury Regulations rather grudgingly admit that an interest
received by electing to take against the will passes to the widow from
the decedent, but only if such interest meets the other requirements
for the marital deduction.'
4
Since interests received by a widow who elects to take against her
deceased husband's will are considered as passing to her from the
decedent if such interests satisfy the other requirements for the marital
deduction, a post-mortem tax-saving opportunity may be available
when a will is probated. In Will of Uihlein5 the husband had executed
a will prior to the passage of the Revenue Act of 1948.16 The will
might have been designed to avoid a second death tax when the wife
died since most of the estate was placed in a trust under which the
wife was entitled to a life income plus a very limited power to appoint
the corpus at her death. As explained later,'7 the wife's interest under
such a trust would not qualify for the marital deduction when the
husband died, but although his death did not occur until May 20, 1950,
the will was never changed so as to give the wife an interest in the
trust which would qualify for the marital deduction.' 8 On the hus-
"3 Sen. Rep., supra note 6, at 334.
'1 "The following rules are applicable where the surviving spouse may elect be-
tween a property interest offered to her under the decedent's will or other in-
strument and a property interest to which she is otherwise entitled (such as
dower, a right in the decedent's estate, or her interest under community prop-
erty laws) of which adverse disposition was attempted under such will or
other instrument. If the surviving spouse elects to take against the will or
other instrument, then (1) the property interest offered thereunder is not con-
sidered as having 'passed from the decedent to his surviving spouse' and (2)
the dower or other property interest retained by her is considered as having so
passed only if it otherwise so qualifies under this section." Treas. Regs. 105,
§81.47a (f).
15 264 Wis. 362, 59 N.W.2d 641 (1953).
26 The original will was executed November 23, 1946, and a codicil on March 20,
1948. Brief of Appellant Guardian ad Litem, p. 10. The Revenue Act of 1948
became effective April 2, 1948, although section 361, containing the marital
deduction provision, was made applicable to estates of decedents dying after
December 31, 1947. 62 STAT. 121 (1948).
IT See p. 27.
's Opinion No. 210 of the Professional Ethics Committee of the American Bar
Association, reported in 27 A.B.A.J. 319 (1941), states:
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band's death the widow elected to take against the will. A widow who
so elects is entitled to three different types of interest in the probate
estate under Wisconsin law.19 In the unusual situation where title to
the family residence was in the husband alone, rather than in the
husband and wife as joint tenants, the widow is entitled to the same
homestead rights as if the husband had died intestate leaving lawful
issue. Since these rights consist of a life estate terminable upon
remarriage, 20 they amount to an objectionable terminable interest and
do not qualify for the marital deduction.2 1 The second interest is the
dower rights which the widow would have if her husband had died
intestate leaving lawful issue. In Wisconsin, this is an estate in fee
simple in one-third of "all the lands whereof her husband was seized
of an estate of inheritance at any time during the marriage" except
the family residence.2 2 Such an interest qualifies for the marital de-
duction.23 The third interest embraces one-third of the "net personal
estate. '24 Unless the probate estate includes any "tainted assets," 25
"Many events transpire between the date of making the will and the death
of the testator. The legal significance of such occurrences are often of serious
consequence, of which the testator may not be aware, and so the importance
of calling the attention of the testator thereto is manifest.
"It is our opinion that where the lawyer has no reason to believe that he has
been supplanted by another lawyer, it is not only his right, but it might even be
his duty to advise his client of any change of fact or law which might defeat
the client's testamentary purpose as expressed in the will.
"Periodic notices might be sent to the client for whom a lawyer has drawn
a will, suggesting that it might be wise for the client to re-examine his will to
determine whether or not there has been any change in his situation requiring
a modification of his will."
19 WIs. STATS. (1953) §233.14. This section requires that the election be made by
filing in the court having jurisdiction over the settlement of the deceased hus-
band's estate a "notice in writing" within one year after the filing of a petition
for the appointment of an administrator or for the probate of the husband's
will. But §233.15 (2) allows an extension of time in the event of a will contest
or will construction proceeding.
20 WIs. STATS. (1953) §237.02 (2).
21 See p. 19, infra. In the more common situation where the family residence
was held by the husband and wife as joint tenants, the widow's estate in fee
simple as surviving joint tenant would qualify for the marital deduction. See
p. 20, infra.
22 WTfiS. STATS. (1953) §233.01.
23 See p. 19, infra.
24 Supra note 19.
25 I.R.C. §2056 (b) (2) provides that if an interest passing to the surviving spouse
may be satisfied out of assets which would not qualify for the marital deduc-
tion if such assets passed directly to such spouse then it is assumed that such
"tainted assets" are used to satisfy the spouse's interest and to that extent the
marital deduction is denied. "This rule is addressed generally to situations in
which the surviving spouse is a pecuniary or residuary legatee or is a bene-
ficiary of a trust created by the decedent during life or by will, or is the heir
of an intestate decedent. In such cases there has passed to the surviving spouse
an interest in property represented by all the assets included in the decedent's
general estate (which does not include assets named by the decedent to pass
under specific bequests) or included in the trust. However, under the rule of
[section 2056 (b) (2)], if any such assets (in the general estate or trust)
would, if specifically passing to the surviving spouse, not be deductible, the
[Vol. 39
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this interest should likewise qualify for the marital deduction. 26 In
the Uihlein case 27 the decedent's gross estate amounted to more than
$7,000,000 and Federal estate taxes were reduced by over $1,000,000
by the widow's election to take against the will.28 Presumably a smaller
tax saving would be important to persons interested in lesser estates. 29
To the extent that the widow who elects to take against her husband's
will thereby increases the taxable estate" at her death, there is in part
only a postponement of the tax otherwise payable when the husband
diedV1 Since there is nothing comparable to the marital deduction
under the Wisconsin inheritance tax,3 2 a widow who elects to take
against the will is not likely to reduce inheritance taxes payable when
the husband dies, but may instead increase the inheritance taxes pay-
able upon her death.3 3 The possibility of tax savings being offset by
increased probate expenses should also be considered before advising
a widow to elect to take against her husband's will. Unless the other
value of such assets shall be applied in reduction of the amount otherwise de-
ductible for the general or residuary bequest or transfer in trust ....
"Example (1). The decedent bequeaths $50,000 to his surviving spouse. The
general estate includes a term for years (valued at $60,000 in determining the
value of the decedent's gross estate) in Blackacre-an interest retained by the
decedent after a gift of Blackacre to his son. Accordingly, the marital deduc-
tion with respect to the bequest of $50,000 is reduced to zero. It is immaterial
whether the surviving spouse actually receives the term for years ....
"In determining the assets out of which the interest passing to the surviving
spouse may be satisfied, such assets are determined prior to payment of any
general claims, but without including named property specifically bequeathed
or devised." Sen. Rep., supra note 6, at 340-341.
Where a decedent has made inter vivos gifts it is possible that his estate
may contain "tainted assets," but it is more probable that any interest retained
in connection with such transfers would be only a life interest.
26 See p. 12, infra.
2
7 Supra note 15.
28 Reply Brief of Widow, p. 3.
29 See Rogers and Sterling, Post Mortem Estate Planning, 14 U. PiTT. L. Rv.
224, 228 (1953).30 Defined in I.R.C. §2051 as the gross estate less the $60,000 exemption and any
other allowable deductions.
31 Assuming the wife's taxable estate is taxed at lower rates than those which
would have been imposed on the husband's taxable estate had the wife taken
under his will, there is always some tax saving, but to the extent that the tax
on the widow's death is greater, payment of that amount of tax at the hus-
band's death has been merely postponed. However, postponement of payment
offers an economic advantage where assets which would otherwise have been
used to pay the tax at the husband's death produce income or other benefit to
the wife until her death. See Mannheimer et al., The Use of a Formula Clause
for the Marital Deduction, 32 TAXEs 381, 382 (1954).3 2
WIS. STATs. (1953) §72.045 allows an exemption of $15,000 out of the first
$25,000 transferred to the wife and $5,000 from the first $25,000 transferred to
a husband. The tax rates under §§72.02 and 72.03, while lower than on trans-
fers to uncles, aunts, and their issue, are the same as the rates on transfers to
decedent's issue, ancestors, brothers and sisters.
33 Since inheritance tax rates cannot exceed 19.5 percent, while Federal estate tax
rates are 22 percent on the part of a taxable estate exceeding $40,000 but not
exceeding $50,000 and step up for the larger estates until ultimately a rate of
77 percent is reached, increased inheritance taxes may not completely offset
Federal estate tax savings. Wis. STATs. (1953) §§72.035, 72.74; I.R.C. §2001.
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beneficiaries under the husband's will can agree upon the distribution
of assets remaining after the widow's statutory share has been carved
out of the estate, additional court proceedings can be expected. 34 Also,
if the widovy is given interests under her husband's will which would
not require a second administration at her death, electing to take
against the will is likely to change this.
A rather ingenious extension of the idea of saving Federal estate
taxes by having the widow elect to take against the will is illustrated
in Moore v. Brodrick.3 There the husband's will also appears to have
been executed prior to the Revenue Act of 1948. Presumably he had
made inter vivos gifts to his wife, since assets retained until his death
passed under his will to his daughter rather than to the wife.36 On the
husband's death none of the probate assets would qualify for the mari-
tal deduction unless the widow elected to take against the will, which
she did. Prior to his death, the decedent had purchased government
bonds and registered them in his and the daughter's names as co-
owners. Since the decedent had furnished the entire consideration for
the bonds, they were includible in his gross estate for Federal estate
tax purposes ;37 but unless they were also a part of the probate estate,
they could not be considered in computing the widow's statutory share.
One possible theory which could have been used is that since the dece-
dent retained possession of the bonds until his death and could have
redeemed them at any time prior to death without the consent of the
daughter, there was no completed inter vivos gift to the daughter
because of lack of delivery. 38 Instead, the widow contended in probate
court proceedings that the bonds purchased by the decedent consti-
tuted an advancement to the daughter which should be charged against
the latter's interest in the probate estate and that other assets should
be distributed to the widow to equalize the advancement to the daugh-
ter. The probate court agreed with this contention and gave the widow,
in addition to what she would otherwise receive, assets equal in value
to the bonds.39 The executors filed a Federal estate tax return in
which these additional assets were considered eligible for the marital
34 Distribution problems that can arise when the widow elects to take her statu-
tory share are discussed in Gigure, The Widow's Election to Take Against a
Will, 38 MARQ. L. REv. 36 (1954).
35 123 F.Supp. 108 (D. Kan., 1954). Findings of fact and conclusions of law are
reported in 1954 Prentice-Hall Federal Tax Service, Par. 132,751.
36 Except for a $5,000 legacy to a granddaughter.
37 I.R.C. §2040.
38 See Note, 1947 Wis. L. REv. 447, especially cases cited in note 5.
31 Under Wisconsin law if an advancement has been made by a person who sub-
sequently dies intestate, the hotchpot concept is applied so as to equalize the
shares received by the other heirs. Wis. STATs. (1953) §§318.24-318.28. Assum-
ing these statutes can apply where a decedent dies testate and his widow elects
against the will, it may be difficult to find that an advancement has been made
unless it was so designated in the will. See Estate of Pardee, 240 Wis. 19, 1
N.W.2d 803 (1942).
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deduction. On audit no deduction was allowed for these assets and a
deficiency in excess of $14,000 was assessed. After payment of this
amount a suit for its refund was brought in the Federal District Court.
The Government contended that it was not bound by the probate court
decree, seemingly on the ground that the proceedings in which it was
rendered were not adversary.40 But the Federal District Court granted
a refund, finding that the proceedings were "adversary throughout,"
the daughter and her husband as executors and the daughter individu-
ally having "opposed and resisted" the widow's assertion that the
bonds were an advancement, irrespective of the fact that the widow
might have elected to take against the will in order to save taxes and
that after receiving her statutory share she gave it to the daughter.
In addition, the court held that the bonds should have been included
in the probate estate even if they were not decreed to be an advance-
ment, since under local law there had been no completed inter vivos
gift of the bonds prior to decedent's death. The Government has
authorized an appeal from this decision4l so it is not yet certain that
the taxpayer is the victor.
B. Settlement of Surviving Spouse's Will Contest
Since a widow who elects to take against her deceased husband's
will is, apart from homestead rights, entitled to only one-third of the
probate estate, under Wisconsin law this would not use up the maxi-
mum marital deduction 42 unless she also received a substantial amount
of non-probate assets.4 3 There are three situations where a widow
would receive more of the probate estate by contesting the will and
having it denied probate than by electing to take against it.44 When no
issue survive and a denial of probate requires the estate to be distrib-
uted as intestate property, the widow would receive the entire net
estate as sole heir.4 5 If one child also survives, the widow is entitled
to one-half of the net personal estate instead of the one-third that she
would receive by electing to take against the will.4 6 The third situation
is where denial of probate for a later will means a prior will is then
40 Cf. Findings of Fact Nos. 13 and 16, supra note 35.
4' 1955 Prentice-Hall Federal Tax Service, Par. 132,105.
42 Supra note 10.
Or she claimed in addition a widow's allowance which could qualify for the
marital deduction. See pp. 13-17, infra.
4 Advising a widow to contest her deceased husband's will on a ground such as
lack of testamentary capacity in order to have tax dollars seems clearly im-
proper, but gentler issues, such as revocation, might be raised.
45 WIS. STATS. (1953) §§237.01, 237.02 and 318.01. Since not more than half of
the adjusted gross estate could possibly qualify for the marital deduction, if
this estate amounts to more than $120,000, there would be some tax payable
after the husband's death. Also see notes 31-33 supra and accompanying text.
The additional expense resulting from will contest proceedings would, of
course, reduce any tax savings.
46 Wis. STATS. (1953) §318.01.
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entitled to probate 7 and the prior will gives the widow more than
one-third of the probate estate. Since a surviving husband has no
right to elect to take against his deceased wife's will,48 his only re-
course is to contest the will.49
Assuming the contest is carried through to the point where the will
is denied probate and the estate is distributed under the intestacy
statutes or a prior will, the requirement that an interest in property
pass from the decedent to a surviving spouse is clearly satisfied.50
But suppose that the other beneficiaries under the contested will nego-
tiate a settlement of the controversy with the surviving spouse by
giving up to the latter part of their shares. 5' Does this property pass
from the decedent to the surviving spouse? A recent Wisconsin
Supreme Court decision held that, so far as computation of the Wis-
consin Inheritance Tax is concerned, it does not.52 The issue raised
was whether the tax should be assessed on the disposition of the estate
contained in the original will or under the compromise agreement. 53
The court held that the tax should be based on the distribution pro-
vided in the original will, since under the compromise the beneficiary
gave up part of what he had received under the will to the con-
testants.
54
Code section 2056 (d) provides that an interest "disclaimed" by
someone other than the surviving spouse, to which the latter is then
entitled, shall not be considered as passing from the decedent to the
surviving spouse. Yet the Senate Report on the bill which became
the Revenue Act of 1948 stated:
4 This would necessarily be restricted to situations where the prior will was not
revoked by execution of the later will. Cf. Estate of Svendso, 257 Wis. 335,
43 N.W.2d 343 (1950) with In re Noon's Will, 115 Wis. 299, 91 N.W. 670
(1902).
48 Wis. STATS. (1953) §233.14 limits election rights to "a widow."
4 Even curtesy rights give way to a contrary testamentary disposition. Wis.
STATS. (1953) §233.23.
5o Supra pp. 2-3. It is unlikely that the Government could successfully contend
that such proceedings were collusive in view of the strong public policy in Wis-
consin which favors the admission to probate of all valid wills. See note 54
infra.
51 Wis. STATS. (1953) §316.31 provides that such agreements shall be "valid and
binding" when approved by the probate court.
52 Estate of Jorgenson, 267 Wis. 1, 64 N.W.2d 430 (1954).
5 Since the sole beneficiary under the will was not a relative of the testatrix, but
the contestants were, a lower tax would result from a computation based on
the settlement because of the lower rates and higher exemptions on transfers
to relatives. WIs. STATS. (1953) §§72.02, 72.045.
54 Construing the statute on compromises, supra note 51, "as authorizing the ad-
mission of a will to probate, not as executed by the testator, but as judicially
amended, would require us to hold the statute unconstitutional, because such a
construction would be against the fundamental constitutional right to dispose
of property by will as discussed above, and no one-the beneficiaries, the heirs,
the courts, or the legislature, or all of them together-can rewrite a will so as
to effect a distribution other than that provided by the testator." 267 Wis. 7-8,
64 N.W.2d at 434. See Scheller, The Right to Dispose of Property by Will, 37
MARQ. L. REv. 92 (1953).
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"If the surviving spouse takes under the decedent's will, the
interest passing to her is determined from the will. In this con-
nection proper regard should be given to interpretations of the
will rendered by a court in a bona fide adversary proceeding.
If, as a result of a controversy involving a bequest or devise to
the surviving spouse, such spouse assigns or surrenders an
interest in property pursuant to a compromise agreement in
settlement of such controversy, the amount so assigned or sur-
rendered is not deductible as an interest passing to such spouse.
Moreover, any interest received by the surviving spouse under
a settlement which does not reflect her rights under the local
law does not pass to the surviving spouse from the decedent. "
(italics added)
Hence, the Treasury Regulations provide:
"If as a result of a controversy involving the will, or involving
any bequest or devise thereunder, a property interest is assigned
or surrendered to the surviving spouse, the interest so acquired
will be regarded as having 'passed from the decedent to his sur-
viving spouse' only if such assignment or surrender was a bona
fide recognition of enforcible rights of the surviving spouse in
the decedent's estate."56 (italics added)
It seems quite reasonable to conclude from these pronouncements that
both the Senate Finance Committee and the Treasury considered an
interest which technically passed from the decedent to beneficiaries
other than the surviving spouse and then from them to such spouse,
for Federal estate tax purposes, as passing directly from the decedent
to the surviving spouse, if such interest represented a good faith satis-
faction of the spouse's rights under local law.
The question of whether such a good faith settlement had taken
place was presented to the Tax Court in Estate of Gertrude P. Bar-
rett.5 7 There a surviving husband, who was actually, though not legally,
separated from his wife prior to her death, retained counsel who
advised him that he had a valid claim against the estate of his deceased
wife. The Tax Court found that the surviving husband "in good faith
made claim" to the executor for the share of personal property, includ-
ing that in an inter vivos trust,5" to which a husband is entitled under
Missouri law in the event of intestacy. He alleged that the trust had
been executed under the influence of decedent's executor, who was
55 Supra note 6, at 334. Norman A. Sugarman (then attorney in the Office of
Chief Counsel and more recently Assistant Commissioner, Technical) inter-preted this as requiring a settlement made in good faith rather than a gift to
the spouse or "the creation of a secret trust." Estate and Gift Tax Equalia-
tion-The Marital Deduction, 36 CALIF. L. Rlv. 223, 262-263 (1948).56Treas. Regs. 105, §81.47a (g).
5722 T.C. No. 78 (1954).
58 Prior to marriage, the parties had signed an antenuptial agreement under which
each renounced all rights in the estate of the other. At the same time the
decedent created a trust, in favor of herself and children by a prior marriage,
over the major part of her personal estate.
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also her brother and lawyer, "in order to keep the decedent's property
away from him," the husband.59 Although no proceedings were started
in the probate court, the husband's attorney conferred with the exe-
cutor and submitted a memorandum of authorities supporting the hus-
band's position. The Tax Court then found that the executor, "recog-
nizing the substantial nature of Barrett's claim," negotiated a settle-
ment under which $10,250 was paid the husband in return for a release
of all claims and a promise not to contest the will. The executor sub-
sequently obtained approval of the settlement by the probate court and,
because of deductions taken elsewhere, $9,813.08 was claimd on the
estate tax return as a marital deduction. The Commissioner disallowed
all except $420 of this amount, taking the position that "the surviving
husband had no valid or enforceable claims against the decedent's
estate under Missouri law." The Treasury Regulation quoted above
60
also provides:
"Such a bona fide recognition will be presumed where such
assignment or surrender was pursuant to a decision of a local
court upon the merits in an adversary proceeding following a
genuine and active contest. However, such a decree will be
accepted only to the extent that the court passed upon the facts
upon which deductibility of the property interest depends. If
such assignment or surrender was pursuant to an agreement not
to contest the will or not to probate the will, it will not neces-
sarily be accepted as a bona fide evaluation of the rights of the
spouse."
Since the settlement in the Barrett case was not pursuant to court
decree after "a genuine and active contest" in adversary court pro-
ceedings, the Commissioner was unwilling to presume the settlement
was a good faith satisfaction of the husband's rights in the estate
of his deceased wife. The executor contended that the settlement
was in recognition of the husband's rights and passed to the latter
by inheritance under the rationale of Lyeth v. Hoey.61 In that case
the contestant had filed a protest with the probate court, but a settle-
ment was reached prior to trial on the issues; and the Supreme Court
held that a settlement received by the contestant, because of his stand-
ing as an heir, should be treated the same tax-wise as property re-
ceived under a judgment following a successfully litigated contest.
The Commissioner attempted to distinguish Lyeth v. Hoey, since in the
59 Subsequent to its execution, the decedent had modified the trust so as to give
the husband a life interest, after her death, in one-fourth of the trust income.
Decedent later eliminated this provision, but the husband also contended that
this change was invalid.
60 Supra note 56.
61 305 U.S. 188 (1938), where the Supreme Court held that a settlement received
by a contesting heir passed to him by inheritance for purposes of the Federal
income tax exclusion.
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Barrett case the husband had not filed any protest in the county court;
but the Tax Court held that this was due to the settlement made with
the executor which occurred while the husband still had time to chal-
lenge the will. Since the settlement was "made in good faith as a
result of arm's length bargainings" in advance of a formal court con-
test, and there was "sufficient basis for a reasonable belief that only
such payment would avoid serious and substantial threat to the testa-
mentary plan provided by the decedent," the entire amount claimed by
the executor qualified for the marital deduction. The Commissioner
has acquiesced in this decision.62
The Wisconsin statute authorizing the compromise of will contests
apparently does not require a genuine and active contest in adversary
court proceedings prior to the settlement,6 3 but "all facts relating to
the claims of the various parties" must be presented by verified peti-
tion ;64 and the compromise is binding only " if found by the court
to be just and reasonable. '65 Hence, it is arguable that in Wisconsin
there never can be a purely "consent decree" approving a compromise.
If the ground or grounds for contest satisfy the statutory test in the
probate court,6 6 the interest received under a compromise agreement,
assuming it is not and could not be satisfied out of an objectionable
terminable interest,67 should qualify for the marital deduction.
C. Bequest in Satisfaction of Rights Under an
Antenuptial Agreement
In Revenue Ruling 54-44661 advice was sought on the tax treatment
of a bequest in the will of a deceased husband intended to satisfy the
rights of the widow under an antenuptial agreement. As illustrated
above,69 double deductions are avoided by construing the requirement
that an interest in property pass from decedent to surviving spouse
as missing if the interest received is deductible under Code section
2053. Hence, the first problem raised by a bequest or devise in satis-
faction of contract rights70 is whether it is deductible under that sec-
tion. The Ruling stated that a relinquishment of marital rights was
not consideration "in money or money's worth" so as to qualify the
widow's claim under the antenuptial contract for deduction under
62 I.R.B. 1954-50, 6.
63 In Estate of Jorgenson, supra note 52, there was a "hearing" prior to the com-
promise.
64 WIs. STATS. (1953) §318.31 (6).
65 WIS. STATS. (1953) §318.31 (5).66 E.g., because of the presumption that a will was revoked when last known to
have been in the possession of the testator but not found after his death. See
Will of Donigan, 265 Wis. 147, 60 N.W.2d 732 (1953).
67 See notes 11 and 25 supra.
68 I.R.B. 1954-41, 14.69 Supra note 9.70 Presumably the same problem would be raised by a bequest to a wife named
in the will as executrix in lieu of statutory fees.
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section 2053. This cleared the way then for the conclusion that an
interest given in satisfaction of such a claim71 passed from the deceased
husband to the surviving widow so that, if the other statutory require-
ments were satisfied,7 2 it qualified for the marital deduction.
III. THE OBJECTIONABLE TERMINABLE INTEREST RULE
Probably the most intricate requirement for the marital deduction
is the one which specifies that the surviving spouse must not receive
an objectionable terminable interest.73 The Code contains two alterna-
tive definitions of such interests.7 4 The first definition consists of
three parts: (1) the interest in property passing to the surviving
spouse must terminate or fail in some way;75 (2) there must be a
possibility that someone else, other than the spouse or her estate, may
enjoy at least part of the property when the spouse's interest ends, (3)
because of a gift of an interest to that person by the decedent. 70 Unless
all three parts of the definition are satisfied, the spouse does not have
an objectionable terminable interest.7 7 The alternative statutory defi-
71 Under the antenuptial agreement the decedent had promised to leave the widow
specific property in his will. Instead, he left her other property of greater
value than that promised in the agreement, the will specifically providing that
this bequest was in lieu of any right under the agreement.
72 An interest transferred when the antenuptial agreement was executed, or at
any time prior to the husband's death, would not qualify unless it was includi-
ble in the husband's gross estate at death. Supra note 8.
73 According to Sugarman, supra note 55, since the general purpose of the marital
deduction is to equalize the tax impact on estates of decedents in common law
and community property states, and a decedent generally could not give his
spouse and other persons successive interests in community property, equality
is promoted by denying any deduction where such interests have been created
by a decedent in a common law jurisdiction. Id. at 235-237.
74 I.R.C. §2056 (b) (1). The "tainted assets" provision, supra note 25, could be
classified as a third definition since it covers assets or their proceeds which
could, but not necessarily, pass to the surviving spouse.
75 "However, the interest of the surviving spouse is not considered a terminable
interest merely because her possession or enjoyment may be affected by events
not provided for by the terms of the bequest. Thus, a fee-simple interest is
not a terminable interest merely because the physical possession and enjoyment
of the property by the surviving spouse will terminate at her death. Nor is such
an interest, or any other interest, considered as a terminable interest merely
because the surviving spouse may lose it by a fire or earthquake or it may be
taken by condemnation or for nonpayment of taxes. An interest in property
is not a terminable interest merely because it may be consumed. Thus, a be-
quest of $50,000 or of a herd of 50 cattle is not a bequest of a terminable in-
terest.
"On the other hand, an interest may be a terminable interest . . . even
though such interest is the entire property. Thus, if the property in which the
surviving spouse has an interest, or all of the interest, is terminable, the in-
terest of the surviving spouse is a terminable interest. Example of such ter-
minable interests are patents, copyrights and annuity contracts." Sen. Rep.,
supra note 6, at 336.
76 The word "gift" is used here in the tax law sense of a transfer for less than
an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth.7T Thus, an absolute bequest to a spouse of a patent expiring two years after de-
cedent's death gives the spouse a terminable interest, but since no one else has
an interest in the patent entitling him to enjoy it after the spouse's interest
ends, she does not have an objectionable terminable interest. Cf. Treas. Regs.
105, §81.47b (d) (viii). Likewise, if a decedent purchased a term for years
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nition of a non-deductible interest also has three parts: (1) The sur-
viving spouse must receive a terminable interest, (2) which was
acquired for her by decedent's executor or trustee, (3) and pursuant
to decedent's directions.78 Unless a conversion after decedent's death
fits this definition, it is immaterial so far as the marital deduction is
concerned."9 Hence, the Treasury Regulations distinguish a direction
by the decedent from "a general authorization to reinvest property"
under which terminable or non-terminable interest may be acquired.80
A. Widow's Allowance for Support Pending Distribution
of the Estate
The first officially published Ruling on marital deductions was in
response to a request for advice on the deductibility of a widow's
allowance during the period preceding distribution of the deceased
husband's estate.81 Prior to the Revenue Act of 1948, section 812 (b)
(5) of the 1939 Code allowed a deduction for amounts "reasonably
required and actually expended for the support during the settlement
of the estate of those dependent upon the decedent. '8 2 Hence, the
Senate Finance Committee Report on the bill which became the
Revenue Act of 1948 assumed the only problem in connection with
widows' allowances was avoiding a double deduction and stated:
"Neither the payments made in satisfaction of [a claim or debt
owed the surviving spouse which was deductible under section
812 (b) (3)83] nor the amounts expended in accordance with
the local law for support of such surviving spouse during the
settlement of the estate pass to such surviving spouse from the
decedent . ".4..",,
No serious problem arose under this approach until the Revenue Act
and bequeathed absolutely the unexpired portion to his spouse, the owner of
the reversionary interest may enjoy the property when the lease terminates but,
since he did not receive the reversionary interest from the decedent, the bequest
is not an objectionable terminable interest. Sen. Rep., supra note 6, at 337.
78 Sugarman, supra note 51, suggests that this definition can also be justified "on
grounds of equalization" since generally a decedent could not direct the con-
version of the surviving spouse's interest in community property. But he con-
siders this rationale an inadequate explanation of the differing tax treatment
of a terminable interest purchased for the spouse by the decedent (and in-
cludible in his gross estate) and a terminable interest purchased by an executor
or trustee pursuant to decedent's directions. Id. at 252-253.
79 "The deduction is determined with respect to interests which the decedent
specifically directed the surviving spouse to have out of estate assets or is de-
termined with respect to the interest of the surviving spouse in the property
represented by assets in the general estate out of which, or the proceeds of
which, the interest passing to her may be satisfied. Therefore, except as pro-
vided in [§2056 (b) (1) (C)] conversions of property after the decedent's
death are immaterial to the deduction." Sen. Rep., supra note 6, at 338.80 Treas. Regs. 105, §81.47c (e).8sRev. Rul. 83, 1953-1 Cum. Bull. 395.
8253 STAT. 123 (1939).
83 Supra note 9.
84 Sen. Rep., supra note 6, at 333.
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of 1950 repealed section 812 (b) (5).85 The Senate Finance Com-
mittee Report on the bill effectuating this change stated:
"Under existing law amounts expended in accordance with the
local law for support of the surviving spouse of the decedent
are, by reason of their deductibility under section 812 (b),
not allowable as a marital deduction .... However, as a result
of the amendment made by this [bill], such amounts heretofore
deductible under section 812 (b) will be allowable as a marital
deduction subject to the conditions and limitations of section
812 (e)." 86
One of the "conditions and limitations of section 812 (e) ' '8 7 is that
an interest in property must pass from the decedent to the surviving
spouse.88 Support for the position that a widow's allowance does not so
pass under Wisconsin law is found in a Supreme Court decision 9
involving the Wisconsin inheritance tax statutes as they existed in
1915.90 In that case the court held that a widow's allowance was not
subject to an inheritance tax since it did not pass by will or under
intestate laws to the widow but rather by order of the probate court
acting under statutory authorization. Strangely enough, the Ruling
referred to above9 did not raise the issue of whether, for Federal
estate tax purposes, a widow's allowance passes from the decedent
to the surviving spouse.92 This may have been due to an inference
from the legislative history set forth above 93 that the "passing" require-
ment was satisfied if there was no danger of a double deduction.
The legislative history of the 1954 Code strengthens this inference.
94
s564 STAT. 962 (1950).
86 Sen. Rep. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950), as reported in 1950-2 Cum.
Bull. 576. Identical language is contained in the House Report. Id. at 478.
87 The marital deduction section of the 1939 Code, now section 2056. Supra note 1.
88 Supra note 7.
89 Estate of Smith, 161 Wis. 588, 155 N.W. 109 (1915).
90 These statutes were subsequently amended so as to expressly cover widows'
allowances. Ch. 369, LAWS OF 1943.
91 Supra note 81.
92 It does first state: "Under the general rule of subparagraph (A) of section 812
(e) (1) of the Code, the marital deduction will be allowed with respect to any
interest in property included in the gross estate which passes froin a decedent
to his surviving spouse as absolute owner." But it concludes: "In view of the
foregoing, it is held that the interest in an estate which passes to a surviving
spouse pursuant to State law in the form of an allowance for support during
the period of settlement of the deceased spouse's estate must constitute a
vested right of property such as will, in the event of her death as of any
moment or time following the decedent's death, survive as an asset of her
estate, in order to qualify under section 812 (e) (1) (A) of the Internal
Revenue Code for the estate tax marital deduction." (italics added)
93 Supra notes 84 and 86.
94H. R. 8300 originally contained an amendment creating an exception to the
objectionable terminable interest rule for amounts paid a widow within one
year of her husband's death. The Report of the Ways and Means Committee
assumed the only problem concerning widows' allowances was whether they
constituted objectionable terminable interests. H. R. Rep. No. 1337, 83rd Cong.,
2d Session (1954), pp. 92, A319. Although the Senate Finance Committee re-
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In any event, the Revenue Ruling stresses only the requirement
that a widow's allowance must not be an objectionable terminable
interest. Since a widow's right to an allowance will normally terminate
when she receives her distributive share of the estate,95 the Internal
Revenue Service could have taken the position that this made it a
terminable interest. But assuming the allowance was not acquired for
the widow by an executor pursuant to decedent's direction, it would
not be an objectionable terminable interest unless someone else, by
reason of a gift from the decedent, could possibly enjoy the property
when the right to an allowance terminated. 9 Such a possibility would
exist only if the property in which the widow had an interest was not
the allowance itself.9 7 Instead, the allowance would have to be con-
sidered an interest in underlying property.95 Under Wisconsin law
the allowance is "out of the personal estate or the real estate, or both,
of the deceased." 99 If a widow were awarded a sum payable monthly
out of the income from estate assets, the allowance could be con-
sidered an interest in those assets producing the income. Unless it
were feasible for the probate court to restrict the widow's allowance
to income from assets which would ultimately be included in her dis-
tributive share, the Government might have assumed, in situations
jected this amendment, its Report gave the following reason: "Under present
law many widows' allowances qualify for the marital deduction without regard
to the time of payment. It is believed that the House bill might raise some
question as to the treatment under the marital deduction of these widows' al-
lowances to the extent not received within 1 year of the decedent's death." Sen.
Rep. No. 1635, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1954), p. 125. The Conference Report,
after quoting from the legislative history of the Revenue Act of 1950, supra
note 86, stated: "Many of these 'widows' allowances' should qualify for the
marital deduction under present law without regard to the time of payment.
Therefore, the added complications of [the provision in the original bill] are
largely unnecessary. The House recedes." H. R. Rep. No. 2543, 83rd Cong., 2d
Sess. (1954), p. 75.
95 E.g., Wis. STATS. (1953) §313.15 (2).
96 See p. 12, supra.97 Otherwise, the allowance would be comparable to a patent in which no one but
the widow held an interest. See note 77 supra.98 "The terms 'interest' and 'property,' as used in section [2056] have separate
and distinct meanings. The term 'property' is used in a comprehensive sense
and includes all objects or rights which are susceptible of ownership. The term
'interest' refers to the extent of ownership, that is, to the estate or the quality
or quantum of ownership by the surviving spouse or other person, of particu-
lar property. For example, if the surviving spouse is specifically devised an
estate for life in a farm, the 'interest' passing to her is the life estate, and the
'property' in which such interest exists is the farm. Generally, the property in
which any person is considered as having an interest is the property out of
which, or the proceeds of which, such interest may be satisfied. Thus, in the
case of a bequest, devise, or transfer of an interest which may be satisfied out
of, or with the proceeds of, any property of the decedent's general estate or of
a trust, the interest so bequeathed, devised, or transferred is an interest in any
or all of such property. If the decedent's general estate or the trust consists of
assets which are themselves interests in property (such as leases), the interest
so bequeathed, devised, or transferred is an interest in such property." Sen.
Rep., supra note 6, at 333.
99 Supra note 95.
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where the widow was not the sole beneficiary or heir,100 that these
income-producing assets would, on distribution of the estate, pass to
persons other than the surviving spouse or her estate. 1i However, a
widow's allowance in the form of specific assets owned by the dece-
dent,102 plus any income earned from them, would avoid this difficulty
since no one other than the widow would have a possibility of enjoying
these assets by reason of a gift from the decedent.
This may explain why the Revenue Ruling exhibits no concern
that someone other than the widow may subsequently enjoy property
which produced her income allowance if the widow has an indefeasible
right to the allowance "for the full period of settlement of the estate."
This right must arise immediately upon the death of the decedent. If
the right is terminable upon her death, remarriage, or other conting-
ency occurring after the husband's death but before the estate is settled,
it is an objectionable terminable interest.10 3 Unfortunately, the Ruling
does not elaborate on why termination of the right to an allowance
prior to settlement of the estate places it in this category. 0 4 It seems
100 If the assets were used to satisfy creditors, it would not be because of a gift
to them from decedent. Supra note 76.
101 I.R.C. §2056 (e), after defining various types of transfers where an interest is
considered as passing from decedent to another, states that "where at the time
of the decedent's death it is not possible to ascertain the particular person or
persons to whom an interest in property may pass from the decedent, such
interest shall, for purposes of [the objectionable terminable interest rule], be
considered as passing from the decedent to a person other than the surviving
spouse." The specific illustrations given in the Treasury Regulations are of
possible beneficiaries who are unknown at the time of the decedent's death, but
they are followed by this general statement: "Whether there is a possibility
that the 'person other than his surviving spouse' (or the heirs or assigns of
such person) may possess or enjoy the property following termination or fail-
ure of the interest therein which paseed from the decedent to his surviving
spouse is to be determined as the time of the decedent's death." Treas. Regs.
105, §81.47b (d). Except for specific bequests and devises, it would seem im-
possible to determine "as of the time of the decedent's death" which benefici-
aries would receive particular assets. The same difficulty would exist where
decedent died intestate.
102 WIS. STATS. (1953) §313.15 (1) allows the widow certain personal items plus
"other personal property to be selected by her, not exceeding in value $400."
This is in addition to the support allowance under section 313.15 (2). The
latter is not specifically restricted to an income allowance, but section 313.15 (4)
authorizes an assignment of "a sum or value not exceeding $2,000" from the
residue of the estate.
103 Supra note 81. According to Wis. STATS. (1953) §313.15 (2) the widow "shall
have such reasonable allowance ... as the county court shall judge necessary
for [her] maintenance" until a final lump sum award is made or refused or
her distributive share is assigned. Baker v. Baker, 51 Wis. 538, 8 N.W. 289
(1881), held that the county court has the power to change an allowance order
previously made "upon a showing that the condition of the estate has changed
or that situations and circumstances of the family have changed." And Estate
of Hemphill, 157 Wis. 331, 147 N.W. 1089 (1914), held a widow's estate was
not entitled to the personal property allowance under Section 313.15 (1), supra
note 102, as a matter of right where she had neither selected nor claimed it
prior to her death.
104 "In many States local courts have held that such allowances, or any rights
thereto, terminate ipso facto upon remarriage and that death also terminates
any rights to subsequent allowances. Under such circumstance, the interest
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due to an assumption on the part of the Internal Revenue Service that
the right to an allowance is itself the property0 5 in which a widow
has an objectionable terminable interest, if all or part of the income
or assets which would have constituted the allowance for the "full
period of settlement" can possibly pass to someone other than the
widow or her estate.10 6 If, for example, a probate court ordered a
monthly allowance paid a widow out of estate income, and she received
some payments but died before the estate was distributed, the Service
seems to conclusively presume that, if under local law the payments
then stop as such, 0 7 the estate income to which the widow would have
been entitled in the form of a widow's allowance had she lived is
not later included in her distributive share of the deceased husband's
estate, nor used to pay claims or expenses of administration, but passes
instead to other beneficiaries or heirs. 08 If an attempt were made to
avoid this result through a probate court decree providing that, in the
event the allowance terminated prior to distribution, the balance other-
wise due should be included in the widow's distributive share, or a
decree allowing only a single lump sum payment instead of a monthly
allowance, the Service would undoubtedly contend that, if the widow
had died before obtaining such an allowance order, none would have
been granted her estate. 0 9 The major weakness in the Service's posi-
tion seems to be the lack of statutory authority for the presumption
that the "allowance" then passes to someone other than the widow's
estate." 0
B. Dower, Curtesy and Homestead Interests
Although a dower or curtesy interest passes to the surviving spouse
from the decedent,-" the Senate Report on the bill which became the
Revenue Act of 1948 stated: "If such interest is a terminable interest,
such as a life estate, the marital deduction would nevertheless be dis-
passing to the surviving spouses of decedents in the forms of allowances made
for their support, pursuant to local law, amount to no more than annuities
payable out of the assets of the estates during the periods of settlement or
until prior death or remarriage of the surviving spouses and, as such, consti-
tute terminable interests within the meaning of section [2056 (b)] of the
Code, no portion of the values of which qualify for the marital deduction."
Supra note 81.
105 See note 98 supra.
106 "Therefore, if a widow's allowance for the full period of settlement of the
estate is such that the allowance, or any unpaid balance thereof, will survive
as an asset of her estate in case she dies at any time following the decedent's
death, the interest thus taken by the widow would clearly constitute a de-
ductible interest ... ." Supra note 81.
107 Supra note 103.
108 This assumes, of course, a situation where the widow is not the sole beneficiary
or heir.
109 The ruling refers to "the allowance, or any unpaid balance thereof," supra note
106, and again to "such allowances or any rights thereto," supra note 104.
110 See note 101 supra.
r1i Supra pp. 2-3.
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allowed under [section 2056 (b) (1)] . 11 2 In Revenue Ruling 27913
it appeared that under Alabama law the widow of an intestate was
entitled to a life estate in one-third of her deceased husband's real
estate when there were surviving lineal descendents. While this interest
was free from the claims of creditors, if land was to be sold by the
administrator for the payment of debts or because it could not be
equitably divided among the heirs, the widow could consent to inclusion
of her dower interest in the sale. The probate court must then order
the administrator to pay the widow, out of the purchase money col-
lected, the fair equivalent of her dower interest, computed with regard
to her age and health, but not more than one-third of the purchase
money. In the case presented for a ruling, land had been sold and the
court awarded the widow one-third of the purchase price.
The administrators contended that this amount qualified for the
marital deduction since it constituted the widow's statutory interest in
lieu of dower and thus passed to her from the decedent, 114 and since
she received the amount as absolute owner it was not an objectionable
terminable interest. But the Service refused to accept the first con-
tention. Instead it ruled that the Alabama statute giving the widow
a share of the sale proceeds was not a statutory substitute for dower
within the Code definition'15 since dower had not been abolished in
Alabama. Nor did this statute give the widow any interest in property
which could be considered as passing to her from the decedent. The
only interest so passing was her dower interest in the form of a life
estate; and, since the remainder passed from the decedent to children
who might enjoy the property upon the widow's death, her dower was
an objectionable terminable interest. The fact that her terminable
interest had been, through the subsequent sale, converted into a non-
terminable interest was irrelevant, since the first statutory definition
of an objectionable terminable interest"16 must be applied to the interest
passing to the widow at decedent's death.
1 7
112 Sen. Rep., supra note 6, at 337.
113 1953-2 Cum. Bull. 275.
114 I.R.C. §2056 (e) provides: "For purposes of this section, an interest in property
shall be considered as passing from the decedent to any person if and only if
... such interest is the dower or curtesy interest (or statutory interest in lieu
thereof) of such person as surviving spouse of the decedent; . .
115 Id.
116 Supra p. 12.
117 The Ruling cited Treas. Regs. 105, §81.47b (d) which states that the test "is
to be applied with respect to the property interests which actually passed from
the decedent. Subsequent conversions of the property are immaterial for this
purpose. Thus, where a decedent bequeathed his estate to his wife for life
with remainder to his children, the interest which passed to his wife is a 'non-
deductible interest,' even though the wife agrees with the children to take a
fractional share of the estate in lieu thereof, or sells the life estate for cash,
or acquires the remainder interest of the children either by purchase or gift."
This follows Sen Rep., supra note 79.
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Unlike Alabama, Wisconsin statutes provide that when an intestate
is survived by a widow and lineal descendents, the widow "shall be
entitled to a dower defined to be a one-third part of all the lands
whereof her husband was seized of an estate of inheritance at any
time during the marriage" except the homestead." 8 Where a husband
and lineal descendents survive, the husband "shall be entitled to curtesy
defined to be a one-third part of all the lands of which [the wife]
died seized of an estate of inheritance" except the homestead." 9 If
the word "seized" was used in these definitions in the traditional com-
mon law sense of possession or the right to possession of a freehold
estate,'120 dower and curtesy interests would exist only in lands which
the decedent owned in fee simple.' 2' At least, a one-third interest in
land owned by the decedent in fee simple absolute would not be a
terminable interest.
22
However, the surviving spouse's homestead rights under Wisconsin
intestacy statutes consist of an estate for life or remarriage with a
remainder to decedent's issue12 3 and, since comparable to the dower
interest of an Alabama widow, are an objectionable terminable interest.
Converting these homestead rights into a dower or curtesy interest
by a sale of the homestead after decedent's death' 24 might be more
successful tax-wise than the conversion involved in Revenue Ruling
279.125
118 WIS. STATS. (1953) §233.01.
"19 WIS. STATS. (1953) §233.23.
120 Cf. Will of Prasser, 140 Wis. 92, 121 N.W. 643 (1909) with Inglis v. Fohey,
136 Wis. 28, 116 N.W. 857 (1908) and Olsen v. Ortell, 264 Wis. 468, 59 N.W.
2d 473 (1953).
121 The only freehold estates at common law were the fee simple, fee tail, and
life estate. 2 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 8 (1950). Since a life estate is not also
"an estate of inheritance" there can be, of course, no dower or curtesy interest
in it after the life tenant dies; and an estate for the life of another descends
as a chattel real under Wis. STATS. (1953) §230.06. Fee tails are converted
into fee simples under section 230.02.
122 Supra note 75. If decedent owned a defeasible estate, such as a fee simple sub-
ject to an executory limitation, and the widow's dower interest were also sub-ject to this limitation [See 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §529 (1952)], the
widow would receive a terminable interest. But it would not be an objection-
able terminable interest unless decedent had himself created the executory lim-
itation in favor of a third party by gift. Supra note 77.
123 WIs. STATS. (1953) §237.02, which also provides that if no "lawful issue" sur-
vive, the spouse takes the entire interest.
124 The dower statute, supra note 118, provides: "But such widow shall have no
dower in any homestead of which her husband died seized, except in the
proceeds thereof in lieu of her homestead rights in case of sale of the premises
while she has homestead rights therein." The curtesy statute, supra note 118,
contains a similar provision.
125 A Wisconsin taxpayer would not have to show a statutory substitute but
rather that dower (or curtesy) rights in the sale proceeds passed from the
decedent to the surviving spouse. The Service might interpret the statute
quoted above as passing only homestead rights from the decedent at his death,
the dower (or curtesy) rights arising only after a conversion by sale of the
homestead rights. But I.R.C. §2056 (e), supra note 114, merely requires a
"dower or curtesy interest . . . of such person as surviving spouse of the de-
cedent."
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C. The Equivalent of a Legal Life Estate
It is obvious from the preceding discussion of dower, curtesy, and
homestead interests that any legal life estate'26 passing from a decedent
to a surviving spouse is a terminable interest; and, if a remainder
interest in the same property passed as a gift from the decedent to
someone other than the spouse or her estate, it is also an objectionable
terminable interest.1 27 The first case decided by the Tax Court invol-
ving the marital deduction 128 illustrates how the equivalent of a legal
life estate may have been unintentionally created and undoubtedly
surprised tax practitioners unacquainted with the vagaries of property
law. There an Iowa couple owned real estate as joint tenants, govern-
ment bonds as co-owners, and a joint bank account. They executed a
joint and mutual will which contained the following clauses:
"Article Two. Whatever property we own, real or personal, we
jointly own whether or not so recorded,1 9 and we have agreed
and hereby agree that the survivor of us shall have the full use
and income and control of all our property as long as the sur-
vivor of us shall live.
Article Three. After the death of the survivor of us all our
property real and personal, shall be sold by our trustees herein-
after named and the net proceeds shall be divided into two
equal parts to be distributed amongst our nephews and nieces
hereafter named . .. .
After the husband's death this will was admitted to probate, the widow
qualified as executrix, and she also elected to take under the will.
Since decedent furnished all the consideration for the jointly held
assets their entire value was included in his gross estate,"30 but the
widow contended that since she received an absolute interest in these
assets as surviving joint owner her interest qualified for the marital
deduction. The Commissioner maintained that these assets passed to
the widow under the joint and mutual will which gave her the equiva-
lent of a legal life estate and, since an interest also passed under the
will from decedent to the nephews and nieces which entitled them to
enjoy the property underlying the widow's interest after her death,
she had an objectionable terminable interest. A substantial majority
126 The adjective "legal" refers here to common law life estates as distinguished
from equitable life interests in trust property.
127 "H (the decedent) devised real property to W (his surviving wife) for life,
with remainder to A and his heirs. The interest which passed from H to W is
a 'non-deductible' interest since it will terminate upon her death and A (or
his heirs or assigns) will thereafter possess or enjoy the property." Treas.
Regs. 105, §81.47b (d) (i).
128 Estate of Emmet Awtry, 22 T.C. No. 14 (1954), [reversed by U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, 4 TAx FORTNIGHTER 460 (1955) Ed.].
129 Under Wisconsin law this will would not be sufficient to convert property
owned separately into joint ownership. Estate of Gabler, 265 Wis. 126, 60 N.W.
2d 720 (1953).
130 Supra note 37.
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of the Tax Court judges accepted the Commissioner's argument, find-
ing that under Iowa law the rights of a surviving spouse who elects to
take under a joint and mutual will are fixed by its terms and the will
in the case at bar was intended to cover jointly held property.131
Where such a will expressly covers jointly held property or insurance
payable to the surviving spouse 32 it would probably have the same
effect under Wisconsin Law.133 It is not clear, however, whether
this result can be avoided by a surviving widow electing to take
against the will'
3 4
Estate of Thomas I. White 13. illustrates the ease with which the
Tax Court finds the equivalent of a legal life estate in life insurance
settlements. There the husband owned several policies on his life. In
1936 he made an agreement with the insurer under which his wife, as
primary beneficiary, was to receive payments under an interest option
with the privilege of changing to a life income option with installments
certain. The agreement also provided that in the event of the wife's
death the children, as contingent beneficiaries, should have interest
payments plus a right to'withdraw principal upon attaining a certain
age. But if the wife had elected the installment option prior to her
death, the children were to continue to receive the remaining payments
under this option with the right of commutation upon reaching a
certain age. In addition, the husband assigned all rights under the
policies, including the right to change beneficiaries and settlement
options, to his wife, but if he survived her, the rights were to revest
in him. In 1941 the wife executed, with the husband's consent, an
instrument directing the insurer to pay the-proceeds to her estate if she,
the contingent beneficiaries, and no children of the latter survived the
husband. It further provided that in the event of her death prior to
her husband's the rights under the policies should vest in her personal
31 In Estate of Gust Marion Peterson, 23 T.C. No. 126 (1955), the Tax Court
reached a similar result under Nebraska law, not only as to jointly held
property, but also with respect to the proceeds of insurance policies payable in
lump sums to the surviving widow.
132 Cf, Hutson v. Jenson, 110 Wis. 26, 85 N.W. 689 (1901).
133 Cf. Doyle v. Fisher, 183 Wis. 599, 198 N.W. 763 (1924) and Estate of Schefe,
261 Wis. 113, 52 N.W.2d 375 (1952) with Will of Schaech, 252 Wis. 299, 31
N.W2d 614 (1948).
134 If a joint and mutual will creates an ordinary contract, it should be binding ir-
respective of whether the surviving spouse elects to accept benefits under the
will. See generally Sparks, Legal Effect of Contracts to Devise or Bequeath
Prior to the Death of the Promisor, 53 MicH. L. REv. 1 (1954). Under this
approach, assets received by a widow electing to take against the will would
not qualify for the marital deduction to the extent that such assets are "sub-ject to a binding agreement by such spouse to dispose of such interest in
favor of a third person." Treas. Regs. 105 §81.47a (2). But the contract in-
volved here may not be an ordinary one under Wisconsin law. The Doyle
and Schefe cases cited in the proceding note, held the agreement enforcible in
equity when the surviving joint testator accepted benefits under the will from
the decedent.
'13 22 T.C. No. 83 (1954).
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representative rather than in her husband. On his death in 1948 the
husband was survived by his wife and children. The Commissioner
having included the insurance proceeds in the deceased husband's gross
estate, 13 his executors contended that the widow's interest qualified
for the marital deduction. Since the husband had only assigned his
rights under the policies, the widow's power to change their terms
ended with his death, except as to her privilege to change to the in-
stallment option described above. 13 7 Hence, the executors urged that,
since under her right to change beneficiaries during her husband's
lifetime the widow could have named herself sole beneficiary, any
interest of the contingent beneficiaries passed to them from her rather
than decedent. 3M But the Tax Court considered this reasoning incon-
sistent with the failure of the executors to resist inclusion of the pro-
ceeds in the gross estate, which could only occur if the proceeds passed
from the decedent to the beneficiaries named in the policies. Since
the widow's interest would terminate at her death and, if at that time
the insurer still held any of the proceeds, the contingent beneficiaries
would enjoy them because of an interest passing to them from the dec-
edent, she held an objectionable terminable interest.1 39
D. Legal Life Estate Plus Power Over Remainder
The legal life estate has been characterized as "a very inflexible
interest" unless the life tenant is given a power of sale. 4 ° For this
and other reasons eminent authorities have stated that legal life estates
infrequently occur in modern practice.' 4' If this were true, Congress
was perhaps justified in not inserting in the Revenue Act of 1948
any exception to the objectionable terminable interest rule for even
those legal life estates accompanied by broad powers over the re-
13GUnder the payment-of-premiums test of the 1939 Code as amended by the
Revenue Act of 1942. 56 STAT. 944 (1942). Since the test under section 2042
of the 1954 Code is now restricted to "incidents of ownership," the proceeds
would not now be includible in the gross estate unless decedent retained a re-
versionary interest of sufficient value. If he did not, the proceeds could not
qualify for the marital deduction. Supra note 8.
137 If an unfettered power to change beneficiaries or settlement options had sur-
vived the husband's death, the executors would probably have relied on the
exception to the objectionable terminable interest rule contained in I.R.C. §2056
(b) (6), discussed at pp. 31-32, infra.
138 If this theory had been accepted, the third part of the first statutory definition
of an objectionable terminable interest (supra p. 12) would have been lack-
ing. It would still have been necessary for the executors to show that the
widow's interest passed to her from decedent, but I.R.C. §2056 (e) (7) merely
requires for this that the proceeds be "receivable" by her without stating
when; and the broad language of §2056 (e) (4) sanctions the transfer of an
interest "at any time."
39 Her power to change from the interest option to the life income option was
not a power to appoint all amounts payable under the policies as required by
I.R.C. §2056 (b) (6), discussed at pp. 31-32, infra.
140 CASINR AND LEACH, CASES AND TEXT ON PRoPERTY 281 (1950).
141 Id. But compare the recent survey of the frequency of legal life estates as a
property arrangement in Iowa. Note, 40 IowA L. RFv. 182, 193-194 (1954).
[Vol. 39
THE MARITAL DEDUCTION
mainder interest. 42 The Senate Report stated: "Generally, a power
of appointment is not an 'interest in property.' Accordingly, no deduc-
tion is allowed with respect to a power to appoint given to a surviving
spouse, except as provided in the special rules in subparagraphs (F)
and (G) of section 812 (e) (1), in the case of certain trust and in-
surance proceeds where the surviving spouse is given a power to
appoint.' 143 Following this approach, the Treasury Regulations issued
in 1949'14 gave the following illustration:
"H devised real property to W for life, and created in W a
power, exercisable by will, to appoint the remainder interest to
any person. In default of appointment by W, the remainder
interest was to go to A and his heirs. Assuming that under the
local law W did not take the real property as absolute owner,
nor as trustee of a trust meeting the requirements of section
81.47a (c), the interest which passed from H to W is a 'non-
deductible interest.' ",145
Since the widow's power was not an interest in property, she received
only a terminable interest from the decedent; and, since there was
a chance that the power might not be exercised, it was an objectionable
terminable interest because A would take in default of appointment.
But the assumptions made in the Regulation suggested two different
possibilities for qualifying a life estate accompanied by a power over
the remainder.
One possibility was any local property law rule which could be
used to give the life tenant a non-terminable interest. Estate of
Michael Melamid146 illustrates an unsuccessful attempt to use this
approach. There a New York decedent had willed to his widow a
legal life estate plus "the power to use my estate during her lifetime
as she may deem advisable for the best interest of my estate, and to
use so much of it as she may need for the way of life to which she and
I have been accustomed." The widow, as executrix, contended that
the right to invade corpus converted her life estate into absolute own-
ership, but the Tax Court held that under New York law no con-
version occurred when, as here, the decedent had named a remainder-
man to take the unconsumed corpus. 47 But where a remainder fol-
142 Sugarman, supra note 55, at 254-255.
143 Sen. Rep., supra note 6, at 333.
144 T.D. 5699, 1949-1 Cum. Bull. 181.
.45 Treas. Regs. 105, §81.47b (d).146 22 T.C. No. 116 (1954).
147 In Wisconsin, conversion into absolute ownership occurs under Wis. STATS.(1953) §232.10 when no remainder is limited on the life estate of the widow
if she has in addition an absolute power of disposition as defined in §§232.11-
232.12. The combination of a life estate plus such a power followed by a re-
mainder interest to another apparently gives the widow absolute ownership
only as to her creditors and purchasers according to §232.08. If liability for
taxes as a transferee under I.R.C. §6901 makes the Federal Government a
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lowed a widow's life estate in personal property the Tax Court agreed
that the widow took an absolute interest in any personal property
necessarily consumable by use.
148
The second possibility was any local law rule which converted
the life tenant into a trustee of a trust qualifying under an exception
to the objectionable terminable interest rule.' 49 An argument along
these lines was attempted in Estate of Edward F. Pipe.150 There a New
York decedent had willed his widow a life estate "with full power to
use, enjoy, sell or dispose of the income and principal thereof, or any
part thereof, for such purposes or in such manner as she in her un-
controlled discretion may choose, it being my desire to place no re-
straint on her in any respect concerning the absolute right of full dis-
position and use of the whole or any part of said income or principal
of my residuary estate, except that she shall have no power over the
disposition of such part thereof as remains unexpended at the time
of her death." The "unexpended part" was to go on the wife's death
to certain named beneficiaries. It was contended that under New
York law the widow took the property as trustee but the Tax Court
held that at most the trust consisted not of the property received by
the life tenant but only of that remaining at her death. Since the sub-
ject matter of such a trust could not be identified at decedent's death,
this was "an adequate reason for presuming that it was not the con-
gressional intent to include this type of 'trust' in the marital deduction
provisions" excepting certain trusts from the objectionable terminable
interest rule.15 1
Both the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Fi-
nance Committee of the Eighty-Third Congress recognized that "be-
cause of doubt under the law of the various States as to what con-
stitutes a 'trust' it is not clear when a legal life estate will qualify as
a trust."'1 52 Hence the 1954 Code, applicable to estates of decedents
dying on or after August 17, 1954,53 now provides:
"In the case of an interest in property passing from the dece-
dent, if his surviving spouse is entitled for life to all the income
from the entire interest, or all the income from a specific por-
creditor of the widow, §232.08 would probably still not apply unless the proper-
ty were actually used to satisfy her liability.
'48 Estate of Frank E. Tingley, 22 T.C. No. 54 (1954), applying a Rhode Island
statute to that effect. Although Wisconsin has no similar statute, this is the
common law rule. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §4.4 (1952).
149 This exception is discussed at pp. 27-31, infra.15023 T.C. No. 14 (1954).
151 It appears that under Wisconsin law the trust would consist of the property
received by the life tenant. See Estate of Lenahan, 258 Wis. 404, 46 N.W.2d
352 (1951) and Estate of Larson, 261 Wis. 206, 52 N.W.2d 141 (1952).
152 H.R. Rep. No. 1337, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 92 (1954); Sen. Rep. No. 1622, 83rd
Cong., 2d Sess. 125 (1954).
'5. I.R.C. §7851 (a) (2) (A).
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tion thereof, payable annually or at more frequent intervals,
with power in the surviving spouse to appoint the entire inte-
rest, or such specific portion (exercisable in favor of such sur-
viving spouse, or of the estate of such surviving spouse, or in
favor of either, whether or not in each case the power is exer-
cisable in favor of others), and with no power in any other
person to appoint any part of the interest, or such specific
portion, to any person other than the surviving spouse-
(A) the interest or such portion thereof so passing shall,
for purposes of subsection (a),15 be considered as passing to
the surviving spouse, and
(B) no part of the interest so passing shall, for purposes
of paragraph (1) (A),'55 be considered as passing to any per-
son other than the surviving spouse. This paragraph shall apply
only if such power in the surviving spouse to appoint the entire
interest, or such specific portion thereof, whether exercisable
by will or during life, is exercisable by such spouse alone and
in all events."'' 5
The House and Senate Reports state that this language is designed
"to make it clear that property in a legal life estate as well as property
in trust qualifies for the marital deduction."'5 '1
Attorneys engaged in estate planning under the new Code are now
faced with the problem of determining what type of legal life estate
a wife must receive in order to qualify the transfer for the marital
deduction. The first general requirement is that the wife must be
"entitled for life to all the income from the entire interest, or all the
income from a specific portion thereof, payable annually or at more
frequent intervals." In Wisconsin this would presumably mean that
the wife must receive an "absolute life estate" as distinguished from
a "life support estate."1581 Fear has been expressed that, since statutory
and case law deal with only a few of the problems of apportioning
benefits and burdens between a legal life tenant and remainderman,
"[t]he rest have to be resolved by negotiation or provision in the
instrument-the net effect of which may well be to shift to the life
tenant a larger share of the burden and place in jeopardy the marital
deduction requirements of full beneficial enjoyment."15 9 But it seems
unlikely that the new Treasury Regulations when issued will be more
stringent than those dealing with power-of-appointment trusts under
the old Code 60 or that apportionment rules developed in the law of
trusts cannot be applied by analogy to legal life tenants and remainder-
154 Supra note 7.
155 Supra note 74.
158 I.R.C. §2056 (b) (5).
157 Supra note 152.
168 See Estate of Larson, 261 Wis. 206, 52 N.W.2d 141 (1952).
159 Fleming, Present Status of the Marital Deduction, 33 TAxES 167-168 (1955).
160 Treas. Regs. 105, §81.47a (c).
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men. The second general requirement necessitates giving the wife
a power to appoint the property in which the wife has the life estate
to herself or to her estate. An unlimited power of invasion should
satisfy this requirement1 6' but a power to invade when necessary for
support would not qualify the transfer 16 2 unless the life tenant had in
addition a power to appoint assets remaining at her death to her estate.
Once it has been determined what type of life estate must pass to a
surviving spouse in order to qualify for the marital deduction, the
next problem is deciding whether such a transfer is preferable to other
types, particularly an outright gift and a trust. Professor Casner has
suggested four possible advantages of a legal life estate over an out-
right gift. 163 The first two are that in many jurisdictions appointive
assets would not be subject to claims of the wife's creditors at her
death unless she exercised the power, nor would these assets be part
of her probate estate and subject to the delays and expenses of ad-
ministration. Wisconsin does not appear to be one of these jurisdic-
tions. If the wife has an absolute power of disposition 6 4 she is con-
sidered the owner of an outright interest as to her creditors 6 5 and
such property would then have to be considered part of her probate
estate.16  The third advantage existing in many jurisdictions is the
freedom of the appointive assets from state inheritance taxes at the
wife's death. Here again Wisconsin law is to the contrary. Upon
the husband's death the wife is taxed as though she had received an
absolute interest167 and on her death the property is taxed a second
time, whether the power was exercised or not.16 8 The fourth advant-
age is the freedom of the appointive assets from the marital claims
of the wife's second husband where she dies without having appointed
to him. There appear to be no Wisconsin cases in point but, con-
sidering the limited statutory rights of a surviving husband,'16 9 Wis-
consin would probably follow the general rule here. A fifth advantage
might possibly appeal to some husbands, namely, controlling the de-
volution of the property through a gift in default if the wife failed to
exercise her power of appointment. 7 '
161 Cf. Treas. Regs. 105, §81.47a (c) (i). Care should be taken to spell out the
lack of any limitations on this power. See Fleming, supra note 159, at 168.162 This does not appear to be a power to appoint a sufficiently "specific portion."
Cf. the Tax Court's reasoning in the Pipe case, supra note 150.
163 Casner, The Internal Revenue Code of 1954: Estate Planning, 68 HARV. L. REv.
222, 433, 477-478 (1954-55).
164 As defined in Wis. STATs. (1953) §§232.11-232.12.
165 WIS. STATS. (1953) §232.08.
166 See generally ATIlNsoN, WILLS, §116 (1953).
167 WIS. STATS. (1953) §72.15 (8m).
168 WIS. STATS. (1953) §72.01 (5).
169 Supra notes 48 and 49.
170 ' rith reference to power-of-appointment trusts, the following observations
have been made: "In his effort to have the provisions of his will govern, the
husband need not rely entirely on the wife's inertia, but can throw obstacles
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A legal life estate may have three possible advantages over a gift
in trust. Particularly in small estates, there would be the saving of
trustee's fees in those situations where use of a trust would require a
professional fiduciary rather than a relative or friend who would
waive compensation.' 7' The second arises where a testamentary trust
is not feasible since a testamentary trust always entails the expense and
delay resulting from court supervision.'7 2 The third exists "where the
testator, for personal reasons, does not desire the intrusion of the
impersonal services of a bank's trust department"'73 and no relative
or close friend is available to act as trustee.
E. Power-of-Appointment Trusts
Although the Revenue Act of 1948 contained no express exception
to the objectionable terminable interest rule for a legal life estate
accompanied by a general power of appointment, it did allow a transfer
in trust to qualify for the marital deduction if the surviving spouse
was entitled for life to all of the income, payable at least annually,
plus a power, exercisable by the surviving spouse alone and in all
events, to appoint the entire corpus to herself or her estate. 7 4
The Treasury Regulations issued in 1949175 listed five requirements
for coming within this exception. The first was that the surviving
spouse "must be entitled for life to all the income from the corpus"
and the third that she "must have the power, exercisable in favor of
herself or her estate, to appoint the entire corpus free of the trust
into her path in the form of 'formal limitations' on the exercise of the power.
Without disqualifying the trust, he can in his will provide that (1) to exercise
her power the wife must make specific reference to it in her will and (2) she
must do so in a will made by her after his death." Mannheimer, et al., The
Use of a Forionla Clause for the Marital Deduction, 32 TAXES 381, 385 (1954).
Presumably the new Regulations on legal life estates will allow similar limi-
tations.
171 Whether a real rather than an apparent saving would result depends, of course,
on the type of assets involved, the ability of the widow to manage them, and,
if expert assistance is needed, the relative cost of professional property man-
agement and investment counsel services compared with charges ordinarily
made by a professional trustee.
172 WIs. STATS. (1953) §323.01 requires testamentary trustees to file an inventory,
render an annual accounting, and a final accounting at the termination of the
trust. Where personal property which may be difficult to identify or trace at the
widow's death is involved, some husbands may prefer court supervision. But
if the latter is to be avoided in connection with a legal life estate, because of
the Wisconsin practice of forcing a life tenant receiving property by will to
hold it as trustee, supra note 151, the husband should expressly relieve the wife
from any duty of protecting the remaindermen. The will in the Pipe case,
supra note 150, provided: "I direct that my wife shall not be required to file
any bond or other security for the protection of any remainderman interested
in my said residuary estate ... "
'73 Note, 28 IND. L. J. 409, 413 (1953).
:14 §812 (e) (1) (F) of the 1939 Code as amended by the Revenue Act of 1948.
62 STAT. 118 (1948).
Sugarman has suggested the liability of the surviving spouse for estate and
gift taxes, because of her power over the appointive assets, as justification for
this exception. Op. cit. supra note 54, at 254.
27 Supra note 144.
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.... If the surviving spouse is entitled to only a portion of the trust
income, or has power to appoint only a portion of the corpus, the trust
fails to satisfy conditions (1) and (3), respectively. However, such
conditions may be satisfied by one or more of several separate trusts
created by the decedent. An undivided interest in property may con-
stitute the corpus of a trust."' 76 In Revenue Ruling 54-20177 decedent
had created an inter vivos trust under which the widow was entitled to
the entire net income during her lifetime plus a general power to ap-
point a portion of the trust corpus equal in value to fifty percent of
the decedent's adjusted gross estate, reduced by the value of any prop-
erty passing to the widow outside the trust and qualifying for the
marital deduction. Decedent's will poured his residuary estate into
this trust. Advice was requested as to whether the power to appoint
by itself created a separate trust over the assets subject to the power.
The Commissioner ruled that this power was insufficient to create a
separate trust and, since none was otherwise created by the trust or
the will, the widow merely had a power to appoint only a portion of
the corpus of a single trust. Hence, none of the trust assets qualified
for the marital deduction. A similar trust was under consideration
in Estate of Louis B. Hoffenberg 78s the widow being entitled to all
the net income for life plus a power to appoint two-thirds of the corpus
by will. The executors first contended that the words "entire corpus"
in the statute179 should be construed to mean only the corpus subject
to the power of appointment. The Tax Court held that the plain
language of the statute was to the contrary and that the legislative
history of the Revenue Act of 1948 showed that the phrase "entire
corpus" was not intended to be synonomous with a part of the corpus,' 80
The alternative contention then urged was that this will created two
separate trusts consisting of undivided interests in the same property.
The Tax Court held that whether a single instrument created two or
more trusts depended on whether the creator had expressed such an
intent in the instrument and that there was nothing in this instru-
ment to indicate an intent to create more than a single trust.','
The House Ways and Means Committee Report on H.R. 8300
states:
"Nor is it clear [under present law] where property is placed in
trust and the surviving spouse has an income interest in and
176 Treas. Regs. 105, §81.47a (c).
177 I.R.B. 1954-2, 23.
17822 T.C. No. 146 (1954).
'79 Supra note 174.
180 The executors also urged that the 1954 Code merely clarified rather than
changed pre-existing law. Infra note 182.
181 The same conclusion was reached in Estate of Harrison P. Shedd, 23 T.C. No.
8 (1954), where the widow was entitled to two-thirds of the income for life
plus a power to appoint one-half of the corpus.
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power of appointment over part of the property, when the
interests given the surviving spouse constitute a transfer in trust
qualifying for the marital deduction. The House and your com-
mittee's bill make it clear that . . . a right to income plus a
general power of appointment over only an undivided part of
the property will qualify that part of the property for the mari-
tal deduction.1
182
Hence, the 1954 Code now allows either a right to "all the income
from the entire interest, or all the income from a specific portion
thereof," plus a power to appoint "the entire interest, or such specific
portion."'' 83
The new language raises several questions for the attorney who
desires to draft a "portion" trust. First, there is the problem of de-
ciding what is a "specific portion." The House Report gives the fol-
lowing example ". . . if the decedent in his will provided for the
creation of a trust under the terms of which the income from one-half
of the trust property is payable to this [sic] surviving spouse with un-
controlled power in the spouse to appoint such one-half of the trust
property by will, such interest will qualify as an exception from the
terminable interest rule."' 8 4 This seems sufficient assurance that an
undivided fractional share of the corpus of a single trust constitutes
a specific portion. However, doubt has been expressed as to whether
setting up a fixed dollar amount of the corpus as the specific portion
would qualify.8 5 The second problem is drafting the wife's right to
income so that it will meet the statutory requirement of "all the
income from a specific portion." It will be observed that the example
in the House Report does not give the wife one-half of all the trust
income but rather all the income from one-half of the corpusl1s
Thirdly, must the wife receive income only from the portion over
'
8sH.R. Rep. No. 1337, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 92 (1954). Similar language appears
in Sen. Rep. No. 1622, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 125 (1954).
Attempts were made in both the Hoffenberg and Shedd cases, supra notes
178 and 181, to convince the Tax Court that the 1954 Code merely clarified
rather than changed prior law. In the Hoffenberg case the court said: "We
find only that the [Committee] reports carefully avoid any characterization of
the meaning of prior law." And in the Shedd case: "Perhaps the Committee
was referring to the not infrequent difficulty of determining whether or not
a separate trust was created for the surviving spouse" but that in any event
the prior statute was not ambiguous and the Committee reports do not change
its plain meaning. The Hoffenberg decision has been appealed. 1955 Prentice-
Hall Federal Tax Service Par. 132,101.8 3 Supra note 156.
184 H.R. Rep. No. 1337, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. a319 (1954).
185 Since this amount would not increase despite appreciation in trust assets, the
wife might not have a sufficient degree of ownership. Lovell, Marital Deduc-
tion Simplified, 93 TRUSTS AND ESTATEs 760, 761-762 (1954).
188 "The common formula of 'one-half the income for life and a power to appoint
one-half the corpus at death' should, however, be avoided in favor of 'the
income from an undivided one-half of the corpus for life and a power to ap-
point such undivided one-half at death'." Toll, Provisions of the 1954 Internal
Revenue Code Affecting Trustees, 34 TRUST BULL. (Sept., 1954) 7, 11.
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which she has a power of appointment or may she, for example, be
entitled to two-thirds or all of the trust income though her power is
restricted to one-half of the corpus? A literal reading of the statu-
tory language supports the conclusion that the right to income and
the power to appoint must be coextensive, but it has been suggested
that a more liberal construction would be "in keeping with the inten-
tion of Congress.' '1 87
Assuming a "portion" trust can be drafted which would qualify for
the marital deduction, the question of using it rather than a separate
trust seems to hinge upon whether the former is really simpler and
less expensive to administer. At present there seems to be a diver-
gence of opinion on this point among trust officers. 8
Whether a portion or separate trust is used, the wife still must be
entitled to all of the income, from whichever type is created, for life
and she alone must have a power of appointment exercisable in all
events. 89 Estate of Frank E. Tingley,190 illustrates how a trust which
attempts to provide for possible future incompetency of the wife may
fail to satisfy these requirements. There the widow was given a right
to income plus a power to appoint to herself, but both were to cease
"in case of her legal incapacity from any cause or upon the appoint-
ment of a guardian, conservator, or other custodian of her person or
estate," and the trustee then had "full power and discretion" to either
pay out the income to or for the benefit of the widow or accumulate
it. The Commissioner contended that, although the specified events
never happened, the widow could have lost her right to income and
power to appoint, so she was not entitled to all the income for life nor
did she have a power to appoint in all events. The executor asserted
that since the widow had the right at her husband's death to withdraw
the corpus she was "the substantial owner" of both the income and
corpus. The Tax Court held:
"If [decedent] had referred to legal incapacity alone, the situ-
ation might well be different for any surviving spouse with a
power to appoint by will could later lose the power by becoming
legally incapable of writing a will exercising the power, and
Congress may not have intended that such an event by operation
of law would deny the marital deduction wherever the power
was to be by will. But this testator intentionally made the right
to enjoy the income for life and the power to take down the
corpus depend on events not synonomous with legal incapacity.
18 7 Young, Estate and Gift Tax Changes, 93 TRusTs AND ESTATES 858, 860 (1954).
Also see Casner, supra note 163, at 481-482.
288 Compare Lovell, Marital Deduction Simplified, 93 TRuSTS AND ESTATES 760(1954) with Fleming, Present Status of the Marital Deduction, 33 TAXES 167,
168-169 (1955). Also see Dicus, Some Implications of the 1954 Code for
Estate Planning, 32 TAXES 938, 945 (1954).189 Supra note 156.
19022 T.C. No. 54 (1954).
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Conditions short of legal incapacity could bring about the ap-
pointment of a guardian, conservator, or other custodian of
the estate of the widow and the decedent chose to cut off his
wife's rights should any such event occur. Thus, he named
events under which she could not exercise the power and it was
not exercisable 'in all events'.... "190a
F. Life Insurance Payments with Power of Appointment
The Revenue Act of 1948 also contained an exception to the ob-
jectionable terminable interest rule for proceeds under a life insurance
contract919 naming beneficiaries in addition to the surviving spouse
or her estate' 92 if "all amounts payable during the life of the sur-
viving spouse are payable only to such spouse, and such spouse has
the power to appoint all amounts payable under such contract" to her-
self or her estate. 93 The Treasury Regulations issued in 1949" listed
five conditions for coming within this exception and then stated:
"If the interest of the surviving spouse under a life insurance,
endowment, or annuity contract is in proceeds held by the in-
surer which do not, however, represent the entire amount pay-
able under such contract, the provisions of section 812 (e) (1)
(G) nevertheless apply to such proceeds so held to which all
five of the above conditions apply. For example, an insurance
contract on the decedent's life may provide for payment of the
proceeds into two funds to be held by the insurer. In such case,
if all five of the above conditions are satisfied with respect to
all amounts payable into one such fund, then the special rule of
section 812 (e) (1) (G) is applicable to the proceeds held in
such fund."'195
In Revenue Ruling 54-554196 advice was sought on the proper
treatment of proceeds under an insurance contract which provided
that they be retained by the insurer in a single fund with monthly
interest to be paid to the widow for life and up to one-half of the
proceeds subject to withdrawal by her, the amount remaining at her
19OaThe taxpayer has appealed from this decision. 1955 Prentice-Hall Federal
Tax Service Par. 132,101.
191 This was later amended to include endowment and annuity contracts. Pub. L.
No. 869, 62 STAT. 1214 (1948).
L92 Cf. Treas. Regs. 105, §81.47b (d) (iv) : "H during his lifetime purchased an
annuity contract providing for payments to himself for life and then to W for
life if she should survive him. Upon the death of the survivor of H and W,
the excess, if any, of the cost of the contract over the annuity payments there-
tofore made was to be refunded to A. The interest which passed from H to W
is a 'nondeductible interest' since A may possess or enjoy a part of the
property following the termination of the interest to W. If, however, the
contract provided for no refund upon the death of the survivor of H and W,
or provided that any refund was to go to the estate of the survivor, then the
interest which passed from H to W is (to the extent it is included in H's gross
estate) a 'deductible interest'."
293 §812 (e) (1) (G) of the 1939 Code as amended by the Revenue Act of 1948
and Pub. L. No. 869. 62 STAT. 118 and 1214 (1948).
19, Supra note 144.
2 05Treas. Regs. 105, §81.47a (d).
196 I.R.B. 1954-48, 27.
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death to go to decedent's children. The Commissioner ruled that none
of the proceeds qualified for the marital deduction since under the
terms of the contract "there was no segregation of the portion or
interest in the proceeds subject to the widow's power to appoint such
as would constitute a separate or single fund in respect of such portion
or interest."
The House and Senate Committee Reports on the 1954 Code indi-
cate that changes were made in the statutory exception for life insur-
ance proceeds to bring the section into conformity with the changed
power-of-appointment trust provision.19 7 Section 2056 (b) (6) now
provides that either all amounts payable during the widow's life "or a
specific portion of all such amounts" must be payable only to her and
she must have a power to appoint "all amounts, or such specific por-
tion." Since an undivided fractional share is a "specific portion" for
a power-of-appointment trust,198 it should be the same for insurance
proceeds. It has been suggested that a fixed dollar amount of insur-
ance proceeds should also qualify as a specific portion.199 A specific
portion would appear preferable to a separate fund in estate planning
if insurance companies consider the former less expensive to admin-
ister and offer some inducement, such as increased interest, to en-
courage the choice of this form of settlement.
G. Death in a Common Disaster and Six-Months Exceptions
The Revenue Act of 1948 provided yet another exception to the
objectionable terminable interest rule for a surviving spouse's interest
"which will terminate or fail upon the death of such spouse if (i)
such death will cause a termination or failure of such interest only
if it occurs within a period not exceeding six months after the dece-
dent's death, or only if it occurs as a result of a common disaster
resulting in the death of the decedent and the surviving spouse, or
only if it occurs in the case of either such event; and (ii) such term-
ination or failure does not in fact occur." 200 Because this was phrased
197 H.R. Rep. No. 1337, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 92, a319 (1954). Sen Rep. No. 1622,
83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 125, 475 (1954).
19sSupra note 184.
199 Because of the lack of any fluctuation in value problem. Lovell, supra note 185,
at 762.200 §812 (e) (1) (D) of the 1939 Code as amended by the Revenue Act of 1948.
62 STAT. 117 (1948).
"An example of the application of subparagraph (D) is a case in which the
decedent's will provides that all his property shall pass to his spouse if she
survives him by three months; but if she does not survive him such property
shall pass to X charity. In this case the interest of the surviving spouse will
terminate or fail only if she dies within three months following the date of
the decedent's death. If in fact she does not die before the expiration of such
period (and accordingly the property passes to her under the terms of the
decedent's will), the marital deduction is allowable .... The rule of such sub-
paragraph (D) does not apply to an ordinary life estate, such as under a de-
vise of Blackacre to the wife for her life with remainder to X. While it is
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as an exception to the definition of an objectionable terminable
interest, it did not appear to apply to any of the other exceptions
to this definition, particularly those concerning trust assets and life
insurance proceeds subject to a power of appointment. The power
required under both of those exceptions had to be exercisable in all
events201 and conditioning the power upon surviving the decedent by
six months, or a common disaster in which decedent died, seemed
contrary to this requirement. However, in 1951 the Treasury Regula-
tions were amended to allow this type of condition with respect to a
power to appoint trust assets or life insurance proceeds.2 0 2 Congress
in the 1954 Code ratified this interpretation by providing that the
exception for an interest conditioned upon surviving six months or
a common disaster should apply not merely to the definition of an ob-
jectionable terminable interest but to the entire subsection which con-
tained not only this definition but also the other exceptions to it.20 s
Two recent developments illustrate how easily, and perhaps inad-
vertently, the surviving spouse's interest can be conditioned on sur-
vival for a period after decedent's death and how difficult it is to
bring such conditions within the limited statutory exception. Revenue
Ruling 54-121204 was concerned with a life insurance policy which
named the wife as primary beneficiary provided she was living when
the insurance company received due proof of the death of the insured
husband, otherwise the proceeds were to go to certain designated con-
tingent beneficiaries. The Commissioner ruled that since proof of
death might be submitted more than six months after the husband's
death and the wife's interest would terminate if she were not then
alive, she held an objectionable interest which was not within the
statutory exception even though "the spouse does in fact survive the
condition stated and take the property." In Kasper v. Kellar2°5 a
South Dakota decedent had willed certain property to his widow "if
living at the time of the distribution of my estate," with a gift over
to others if she "dies prior to the distribution of my estate." The
estate was administered and the assets were distributed to the widow
within six months of decedent's death, but the Commissioner refused
to allow any marital deduction since South Dakota law did not require
the distribution of a decedent's estate within six months after his death
true that death of the wife within the 6-month period will cause a termination
or failure of her interest, it is also true that her death at any time will also
cause such termination or failure and accordingly the case does not meet the
test of clause (i) of subparagraph (D)." Sen. Rep., supra note 6, at 341-342.
Also see Treas. Regs. 105, §81.47t (d).201Supra notes 174 and 193.
202 T.D. 5857, 1951-2 Cum. Bull. 159.
203 I.R.C. §2056 (b).
204 I.R.B. 1954-14, 8.
205 217 F.2d 744 (8th Cir. 1954).
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and, hence, "[a]s of the date of the decedent's death there was no
certainty that within the six-months' period the spouse's interests would
become absolute inasmuch as it was possible that distribution might not
have been made within six months of death." The Court of Appeals
agreed with this interpretation of the statutory exception and that
no marital deduction should be allowed unless under South Dakota
law the language in the will gave the widow an indefeasible interest
as of decedent's death.
20 6
208The executors contended that the phrase in the will should be read as meaning
"if living at the time of my death." The case was remanded to the lower court
for a determination of "whether, under wills-and-property law of South
Dakota, the language used and the intention and the circumstances involved
would be regarded as having had the legal effect of vesting and make inde-
feasible in the widow, as of the time of the testator's death, the property
devised and bequeathed to her."
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